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INTRODUCTION

Because the business of mass communications involves free
speech, the first amendment limits the government's ability to
regulate that industry. Consequently the courts, through the articulation of the constitutional principles protecting speech, play
a major role in setting the permissible scope of governmental regulation in this area. Recent decisions by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit which set aside, as a violation of
the first amendment, the requirements that cable television companies carry local television broadcast signals,' raise serious questions about the proper role of the courts in reviewing
governmental regulation of the mass media business. In both
Century Communications Corp. v. FCC2 and Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v.
t Professor of Law, Rutgers-The State University-School of Law-Camden.
A.B. 1958, Oberlin College; J.D. 1961, Harvard University.

1. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-76.61 (1984).
2. 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), clarified, 837 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2014 (1988).

(467)
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FCC,3 the court of appeals found that the "must-carry" rules
failed to satisfy the United States v. O'Brien4 test, a test that applies
to regulations that only incidentally burden speech. 5
The test as used by the court of appeals requires such "a
heavy burden ofjustification" 6 that regulation of cable television
has become extraordinarily difficult. Although the United States
Supreme Court not long ago stated that activities of a cable television company "plainly implicate First Amendment interests," 7 the
Court left open the question of the proper method for evaluating
the regulation of cable television in the face of first amendment
challenges to such regulations. 8 Thus, lower courts, like the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, are left to
grapple with the problem of selecting the appropriate constitutional standard of review.
II.

CHANGING TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEED FOR A
FLEXIBLE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The burden on the courts in choosing an appropriate standard of review is complicated by the constant changes affecting
the communications industry. Technological advances in the
communications media necessitate a shift in approach to the application of first amendment restrictions against government
abridgment of speech. The courts must recognize that as the
forms of communication change so too must governmental regulation. Consequently, they must allow some room for regulation
of the business aspects of communications. The "problem" of
technological advances in the mass communications industry is
not entirely new. In the 1949 case Kovacs v. Cooper,9 the Supreme
Court denied a first amendment challenge to an ordinance which
prohibited the use of sound trucks and amplifiers on city streets.
As the plurality explained, a compromise that kept the speakers
quiet enough to avoid disturbing others would result in an inability to get their message across.
3. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
4. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
5. Century, 835 F.2d at 298; Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1454.
6. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1462; see also Century, 835 F.2d at 295 (circuit court
stated that FCC's arguments "leave us unconvinced" that newer and less onerous version of must-carry rules were "necessary to advance substantial government interest" so as to meet O'Brien test).
7. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488,
494 (1986).
8. Id. at 495.
9. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss3/2

2

Mallamud: Judicial Intrusion into Cable Television Regulation: The Misuse o

19891

CABLE TELEVISION REGULATION

469

In "Kovacs the technological advance, sound amplification,
presented a relatively simple clash of interests: speakers in need
of an affordable means of mass communication versus the right of
the captive listener to choose what he wanted to hear. Writing for
the plurality, Justice Reed said that the greater ease the sound
trucks would afford speakers did not justify using the first amendment to displace the judgment of the authorities that such equipment presented an intolerable nuisance, at least where other
means of publicity were open.' 0 To the plurality, the answer
seemed simple: "The preferred position of freedom of speech in
a society that cherishes liberty for all does not require legislators
to be insensible to claims by citizens to comfort and convenience.
To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of others
would be harsh and arbitrary in itself."''
Justice Frankfurter, who concurred in the judgment, reacted
strongly to Justice Reed's use of the phrase, "preferred position."
He deemed "it a mischievous phrase, if it carries the thought,
which it may subtly imply, that any law touching communication is
infected with presumptive invalidity."' 2 His objection went not to
the idea of protecting speech,' 3 but to the fact that using the
phrase, "preferred position," amounted to "express[ing] a complicated process of constitutional adjudication by a deceptive
formula."' 14 The evil, in Frankfurter's view, was that "[s]uch a
15
formula makes for mechanical jurisprudence."'
Justice Frankfurter's conclusion did not make the case seem
any more difficult than did the plurality's. He believed in the legislature's power to regulate noise, so long as it refrained from
prescribing what ideas might be expressed and did not discrimi10. Id. at 88-89.
11. Id. at 88 (footnote omitted). Moreover, even Justice Black in his dissenting opinion stated:
I would agree without reservation to the sentiment that "unrestrained
use throughout a municipality of all sound amplifying devices would be
intolerable." And of course cities may restrict or absolutely ban the use
of amplifiers on busy streets in the business area. A city ordinance that
reasonably restricts the volume of sound, or the hours during which an
amplifier may be used, does not, in my mind, infringe the constitutionally protected area of free speech.
Id. at 104 (Black, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 90 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
13. Justice Frankfurter clearly supported a wide degree of protection for
freedom of speech. He wrote that "without freedom of expression thought becomes checked and atrophied." Id. at 95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 96 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
15. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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nate "among those who would make inroads upon the public
peace."' 13 In other words, noise could be regulated but the legislature could not engage in censorship.
Justice Frankfurter was concerned that, since regulating
noise encompassed regulating speech, courts would narrowly
construe the regulations restricting speech and make government
justification of the regulation very difficult. This would allow the
courts to supplant legislative judgments in the guise of enforcing
the first amendment.1 7 Frankfurter realized that if the "preferred
position" doctrine took hold, then as the means of mass communication changed, courts could easily overstep their reviewing
function and wind up regulating the mass communications industry rather than leaving the government' 8 free to make policy in
accordance with the usual governmental processes.' 9 That danger is posed in the cases dealing with cable television. Because
regulation of the cable business affects speech, the "preferred position" idea might lead courts to supplant appropriate legislative
or governmental judgments. Indeed, the method used by the
court of appeals in the "must-carry" cases amounts to a "preferred position" idea and seems to present the very dangers
against which Justice Frankfurter warned in his concurring opinion in Kovacs.
Today, complex technological developments in the business
structure of the mass communications industry have blurred the
difference between its general economic regulation and the protections afforded to its product. As discussed above, Justice
Frankfurter feared that the "preferred position" idea would involve the courts in scrutinizing business regulation more intrusively than necessary and lead to substitution ofjudicial judgment
for legislative (and presumably also administrative) judgment
with regard to the proper extent of business regulation. In other
words, where speech and business activities are tied together, the
danger exists that the courts might intrude unduly into the area of
economic regulation and frustrate governmental regulation of the
16. Id. at 97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
17. Justice Frankfurter explained: "Nor is it for this Court to devise the
terms on which sound trucks should be allowed to operate, if at all. These are
matters for the legislative judgment controlled by public opinion." Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
18. The term government as used here includes administrative agency action of a legislative nature. For discussion of the law governing an agency's rule
making authority, see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S.
519 (1977).
19. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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business aspects of mass communications. With regard to the
noise/speech problem, Justice Frankfurter wanted to make clear
that the legislative judgment on the proper regulation of noise
should prevail provided that the legislature did not engage in
censorship. He stressed that it is "not for this Court to devise the
terms on which sound trucks should be allowed to operate, if at
all." 20 As applied to cable television, this approach warns the
courts not to use the guise of a secondary first amendment issue
to supplant the legislature's judgment as to the proper scope and
21
nature of business regulation.
III.

ORIGINS OF THE MUST-CARRY REQUIREMENT

Ever since the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
began regulating cable television systems,2 2 it has required those
systems to carry, at a minimum, all of the over-the-air signals
available to the area served. 23 The United States Supreme Court
noted the existence of these must-carry rules in the course of up20. Id. at 96-97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
21. For further analysis of the cases in this area, see Knecht & Grinonneau,
Challenging Constitutionality of Must-Carry, 8 COMM. & L. 3 (1986); Note, Quincy
Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission: Should the FCC Revive
Cable Television Must-Carry Requirement, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1369 (1986); Note,
Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC: JudicialDeregulation of Cable Television Via the First
Amendment, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1179 (1986); Note, The Must-Carry Rules After
Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission: The Attempt to
Harmonize Mandatory Carriage With Freedom of Speech, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 745
(1987); Note, The Sun Sets on Must-Carry: Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 20
U.S.F.L. REV. 757 (1986).
22. For a concise summary of the regulation of cable television, see L.
POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 216-47 (1987); Mallamud, Courts, Statutes and Administrative Agency Jurisdiction: A Consideration of Limits
on Judicial Creativity, 35 S.C.L. REV. 191, 267-89 & n.424 (1983-84).
23. Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, To Adopt Rules & Regulations to
Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Business-Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems (Second Report & Order), 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 746, 752-53 (1966) [hereinafter Second
Report & Order]; Amendment of Subpart L, Part 11, To Adopt Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Service for
Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Systems
(First Report & Order), 38 F.C.C. 683, 713-19 (1965) [hereinafter First Report &
Order].
The First Report & Order dealt with cable systems which utilized microwave
transmissions. One year later, the Second Report & Order imposed the same mustcarry rules on all cable systems. Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d at 746. For a
concise account of the FCC's experience with must-carry rules since Quincy, see
Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable Television Systems, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,606
(1986) [hereinafter '86 Report], modified, 52 Fed. Reg. 9616 (1987) [hereinafter
'87 Memorandum].
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holding the FCC's jurisdiction to regulate cable television.2 4
While the Court acknowledged that the development of cable television was unforeseeable at the time Congress created the
FCC,2 5 it nonetheless allowed FCC jurisdiction over cable television in order to enable the FCC to preserve the system of local
broadcasting that had been established pursuant to congressional
policy.2 6 Indeed, the FCC had based the must-carry rules on the
need "to ameliorate the adverse impact of CATV competition
upon local stations, existing and potential." 27 The Court, in recognizing the FCC's jurisdiction over cable television, 28 restricted
it "to that [urisdiction] reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the
regulation of television broadcasting.' '29

Because cable systems can import distant signals as well as
carry local stations, there exists a real possibility that cable could
undermine the traditional system of television service based on
local stations serving local communities. 30 Cable systems not

only compete with local stations, but also, to the extent that viewers use cable as the means of receiving local stations, control the
gateway to the viewers. 3 1 As FCC Commissioner Quello recently
32
stated, "[c]able, once installed, is a geographic bottleneck."
Thus, by imposing the must-carry requirement, the Commission
acted to ensure that cable systems did not prevent their competi-

tors, local broadcast stations, from delivering local programming
to their viewers.

33

24. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 167-69 (1968).
25. Id. at 172.
26. Id. at 172-78.
27. First Report & Order, supra note 23, at 713.
28. The contention that the Court rather than Congress "gave" the FCC
jurisdiction over cable television follows from the fact that Congress did not
know about cable television when it defined the FCC's jurisdiction. See Mallamud, supra note 22, at 265-66. Of course, on another level the FCC's jurisdiction stems from the general provision of the Communications Act of 1934, ch.
652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-155 (1986)),
which applies the Act to "all interstate and foreign communication by wire or
radio." 47 U.S.C. § 152(a).
29. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 178.
30. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F,2d 1434, 1439-42 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); First Report & Order, supra note 23, at
700-03.
31. See First Report & Order, supra note 23, at 702.
32. '86 Report, supra note 23, at 912 (separate statement of Commissioner
James R. Quello).
33, The relationship between broadcast and cable systems is not just a competitive one. Cable systems market their services to subscribers on the basis of
the signals carried. Thus, their business is aided by carrying a broadcaster's sig-
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The must-carry rules are also justified because they promote
competition among local broadcasters. By requiring cable systems to carry all local broadcast signals, the must-carry rules prevent a cable company from giving an extraordinary competitive
advantage to some local broadcast stations by refusing access to
rival local stations. The transportation industry similarly has a
34
strong tradition against permitting this type of discrimination.
Although the Supreme Court has held that cable may not be regulated as a common carrier, 3 5 the competition among local
broadcasters should not be overlooked. Moreover, this interest is
very different from the interests involved in the public-access
cases that led the Supreme Court to hold that cable was not sub36
ject to common carrier regulation.
Because the court of appeals in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC37
found the FCC's justification inadequate to sustain the must-carry
rules, it is important to focus on the basis for these rules. Originally, the television broadcast industry was founded on a system
of local markets defined through the licensing process. 3 8 When
the must-carry rules were first adopted, the FCC followed a policy
nal. Similarly, broadcasters often reach viewers through cable. But cable systems also carry non-broadcaster's signals. The non-broadcast signals are paid
for in two ways. First, the cable systems may actually pay the signal originator.
Second, they could offer pay services. Since cable is still in a developmental
stage with regard to these services, it is hard to predict exactly how the competitive situation will develop. For the purposes of this article, the term "competitor" is used to indicate that the cable system delivers signals from sources other
than the broadcaster and may well have a strong interest in selling those signals
for its profit rather than carrying the broadcaster's signals.
34. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 1, 92 Stat.
1390 (1978) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 10741 (1982)).
35. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (Midwest Video H).
36. The rules in Midwest Video H involved public access to cable systems. Id.
at 692. The Court concluded that the "Commission may not regulate cable systems as common carriers, just as it may not impose such obligations on television broadcasters." Id. at 709. In so holding the Court limited the
Commission's power over both television stations and cable systems. Id. at 70607. Given that the FCC's jurisdiction over cable stemmed from the need "to
prevent interference with the Commission's work in the broadcasting area," the
must-carry rules would seem to be distinguishable from public access rules. Id.
Notwithstanding this argument, where a single competitor controls a primary
source of product distribution, it should not be allowed to discriminate among
those requiring access to that distribution network. This is a conflict of interest
which must be kept in mind when evaluating the law applicable to cable television regulation.
37. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
38. See First Report & Order, supra note 23 at 700. See also '87 .Vlemoradimi,
supra note 23, at 3625 (separate statement of Commissioner James H. Quello
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (order in which FCC reconsidered
revised must-carry rules after Quincy decision).
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encouraging the expansion of television service through the development of UHF channels.3 9 Without the must-carry rules, the
FCC saw a very real possibility that cable subscribers would not
maintain television aerials, and that cable would thereby displace
local station service. 40 Thus, an entire industry would be restructured through technological change despite the fact that this industry had been created by governmental regulation and served
important public functions. Indeed, the recognition of these important interests formed the basis for decision in United States v.
Southwestern Cable,4 1 where the Supreme Court held that the FCC
had jurisdiction to regulate cable television. Thus, even if one
views the FCC's early regulation of cable television as a misguided attempt to stifle the growth of cable for the benefit of the
broadcasting industry, 4 2 the must-carry rules stand on a different
footing from other regulations of the cable industry. Unlike restrictions on the importation of distant signals, which were at issue in Southwestern Cable,43 the must-carry rules do not prevent a
cable system from carrying any particular signal. The rules do
not prevent a cable operator from using a channel to deliver any
message the operator would like to distribute. The restriction of
"editorial discretion" arises only to the extent that the system's
signal capacity is limited. 44 Thus, a major issue in the must-carry
controversy is the tension between the limitation that arises from
39. First Report & Order, supra note 23, at 700.
40. Id. at 702. As the FCC explained, if the cable service, for example, carried a distant station that broadcast a network program, the cable subscriber
would have little incentive to obtain that network program from the local network affiliate. Id. at 702 n.26. Even if the programming on a local station were
different, a cable viewer might not try a non-cable station. This would be especially true of UHF stations. Consider also the problem of a new station that was
not carried on the local cable system. Furthermore, the FCC believed that there
was a possibility that many subscribers would not even maintain an aerial after
subscribing to cable. Id. at 702. This would be especially true in areas where
cable was sold to improve signal quality.
41. 392 U.S. 151, 175-78 (1968).
42. See Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1439 n.10. Professor Powe has said: "By the
1970's, it had become clear that the Commission's hostility toward cable was
aimed solely at advancing the economic interests of broadcasters." L. PowE,
supra note 22, at 195.
43. See Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 156-60.
44. In Quincy, the court said: "The more certain injury stems from the substantial limitations the rules work on the operator's otherwise broad discretion
to select the programming it offers its subscribers." 768 F.2d at 1452 (citing
Miami Herald Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)). The less certain injury is the
possibility that local broadcasters will "act as a mouthpiece for ideological perspectives the [cable operators] do not share." Id. (footnote omitted) (citing
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)). Although the court raises the editorial discretion idea, this author has yet to come across any argument by a cable
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cable's limited channel capacity over and above the number of
over-the-air signals in the area 45 and the possible inability of a
broadcast station to reach an audience due to a cable system's
failure to carry it.46
At the tirhe the must-carry rules were first formulated, the
primary concern of both the FCC and the broadcast industry was
that as the number of television viewers who subscribed to cable
increased, more and more viewers would rely solely on cable as
the means for receiving television signals. The actual likelihood
was that most cable subscribers would not maintain their ability to
receive off-the-air signals and that cable systems would fail to voluntarily carry all off-the-air signals. The original version of the
must-carry rules reflected the FCC's belief that most people
would not maintain aerial capacity. 4 7 Although switching devices
which allowed an antenna and cable to be connected simultaneously existed, the FCC believed that "the sheer inconvenience of
switching" would be "an obvious deterrent to its use by a subscriber." 4 8 With regard to the likelihood of signal discontinuance, the FCC admitted that it did not know the answer, but
pointed to the dependence of the broadcasters on cable in the
context of their competitive relationship. 4 9 Insofar as the FCC
was without hard data as to the actual effects cable would have on
broadcasting, the Commission concluded:
[I]t would be clearly contrary to the public interest to
defer action until a serious loss of existing and potential
service had already occurred, or until existing service
operator that a particular message transmitted by a particular broadcaster over
the company's cable is particularly obnoxious to that cable company.
45. Ironically, the Quincy court spoke of "cable's virtually unlimited channel
capacity." As a student commentator pointed out, "It is difficult to reconcile the
court's assertion that cable enjoys nearly unlimited channel capacity with its concern that cable systems may suffer from overcrowding due to the must-carry regulations." Note, Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC: Judicial Deregulation of Cable
Television Via the First Amendment, supra note 21, at 1199.
46. Several interests weigh in favor of preserving a broadcaster's ability to
obtain access: "[T]hese interests are the public's First Amendment right of access to diverse sources of information, the preservation of vigorous competition
among communications services, and the Commission's statutory obligation to
promote a nationwide broadcasting service built upon local outlets." '86 Report.
supra note 23, at 868. (summarizing views of Senator John C. Danforth which
were set forth in his letter to the FCC dated July 22, 1986).
47. First Report & Order, supra note 23, at 702.
48. Id. at 702. In a footnote, the Commission stated: "One of the standard
selling points of CATV service is the subscriber's ability to dispense with expensive or unsightly outdoor antennas." Id. at 702 n.25.
49. Id. at 714.
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had been significantly impaired. Corrective action after
the damage has already been done, if not too late is certainly much more difficult .... 50

In evaluating the FCC's decision regarding the adequacy of
switching devices, it is useful to draw a comparison to the treatment of UHF tuning devices. Pursuant to authority granted to
the FCC under the All-Channel Receiver Act of 1962, 5 1 the FCC
has required television sets to have UHF tuners that are reasonably similar to VHF tuners. 52 Consider the following picture of
viewer activity held by the FCC, and expressed in support of compatible tuning regulations:
For many persons, to a degree varying with the individual, the greater difficulty in tuning UHF stations diminishes the likelihood that the user will opt for
programming offered by such stations. Assuming the
user does decide on viewing UHF programming, moreover, it is more difficult for him to tune the UHF station
properly. As a result, the picture obtained on a UHF
channel is likely to be inferior to its VHF counterparteven though the receiver, if properly tuned, is capable of
producing a picture of comparable quality. This factor,
in addition to the intrinsically more complicated and
time-consuming nature of continuous tuning, tends to
53
deter the use of UHF channels.
Given this model of the typical television viewer, one can understand why the FCC did not think that switching devices (A/B
switches) would be an adequate substitute for mandatory signal54
carriage rules.
Because the Quincy court emphasized the A/B switch as an
alternative to the must-carry rules, without recognizing any of the
difficulties in use of the switch,5 5 it is important to deal with this
issue. By examining the FCC's view of the all-channel receiver
problem, it becomes apparent that the Commission's position re50. Id. at 713.
51. Pub. L. No. 87-529, § 1, 76 Star. 150 (1962) (codified as amended at 47

U.S.C. § 303(s) (1982)).
52. See, e.g, Improvements to UHF Television Reception, 90 F.C.C.2d 1121
(1982); Amendment of Part 15 of the Rules and Regulations With Regards to .4-Channel
Television Broadcast Receivers, 21 F.C.C.2d 245 (1970) [hereinafter '70 Report].
53. '70 Report, supra note 52, at 248 (footnote omitted).

54. See First Report & Order, supra note 23, at 702.
55. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1441.
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garding the A/B switch was in line with a broader notion that easy
tuning is directly related to a broadcast station's ability to capture
market share. Thus, viewed against the all-channel problem, the
FCC's lack of interest in an A/B switch seems in keeping with an
over-all policy rather than a strange idea utilized to deprive cable
operators of their first amendment rights. The Quincy court, however, took the following view of the problem:
Although the cable attaches to the television set through
the VHF outlet, an inexpensive switch (the "A/B
switch") would enable a viewer to alternate between
cable and off-air VHF signals. Indeed, connection of the
cable typically has no direct effect at all on receipt of
UHF signals. Thus, in principle, a cable subscriber with
little or no effort could still view local broadcasts even
without the benefit of the must-carry rules. If that were
the case, cable's gain would not necessarily mean broadcast television's loss, and the Commission's reasoning
56
would be deprived of its major premise.
Of course, there are other justifications for the must-carry rules.
In some areas a major purpose of cable is to provide viewers with
improved reception. In addition the Quincy court recognized that
the A/B switch is of no value where an outdoor antenna is needed
and it is either disconnected or never installed. 5 7 Thus, even
without the difficulty-of-use issue, there are strong interests in assuring that local television stations are carried by cable systems.
Before discussing the constitutional standard to be utilized,
the above interests should be placed in the context of the technological change at issue. By controlling viewer access without FCC
regulation, cable systems could seriously undermine the ability of
local stations to operate. At the same time, cable systems do have
a right to transmit programming owned and broadcast by
others. 58 We tend not to think of regulations which require telephone companies to provide service to individuals, or regulations
which require television sets to be capable of carrying all channels
as raising a first amendment question. While it is true that cable
systems are not common carriers, this should not end the inquiry.
Because the characterization of the business of cable television
56. Id. (footnotes omitted).

57. Id.
58. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2550 (1976) (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. § 111 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
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service affects one's evaluation of the interests involved in its regulation, it is important to make that characterization explicit.
Although a cable system can originate its own programming,
the court of appeals recognized that "most of their viewing fare
consists of retransmissions of signals generated by independent
entities." 59 The court also recognized that although the technology existed for carrying upwards of 100 channels, most systems
carried 12 to 36.60 Since the first amendment injury consists of
restricting a cable system's choice of programming, the mustcarry injury stems from preventing a choice on the channels occupied by the local signals. But it is hard to characterize that as an
injury in light of the fact that cable systems enter a local market
and, at least in the context of the present system of local broadcasting, sell their service in large part on the delivery of those
local signals.
In some respects cable has become a new and independent
means of distributing programming to the viewers. 6 ' In other respects cable serves as a means of delivering broadcast programming. 6 2 When cable began it was a "passive conduit of broadcast
signals." 63 As a passive conduit with the ability to bring signals
from any place around the country to any particular area, it had
the potential to totally disrupt the television broadcasting business and the local broadcast policy on which it had been founded.
Today, cable delivers both local programming and the program64
ming of over forty independent cable networks.
When the FCC regulates cable by requiring cable systems to
carry all of the over-the-air signals in the area served, it is regulating the means of distribution of the programming within its jurisdiction. It is not preventing a cable system from expressing itself
or from carrying any other programming services. The injury of
limiting the cable system's choice arises primarily because a cable
system chooses to install cable capability of a given number of
channels. In fact, a cable system actually operates two businesses:
rebroadcasting local channels and importing selected non-broadcast programming. While the FCC cannot regulate cable as a
59. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1438.
60. Id. at 1439.

61.
62.
etration
63.
64.

Id. at 1452.
See By the Numbers, BROADCASTING, Mar. 6, 1989, at 16 (shows cable penat 54.8%).
Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1452.
Id.
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common carrier, 6 5 it can regulate cable systems insofar as they are
an adjunct to the distribution of television broadcast programming. 6t1 When Congress finally enacted a cable television statute,
it preserved current FCC regulations, and reaffirmed the Commission's power to modify those regulations as it deemed
67
necessary.
By viewing cable as two businesses, and taking into account
the fact that the broadcast industry is still a vital part of the basic
television mass communications industry, the must-carry rules
can be seen as limited to regulating the distribution of television
signals within the FCC's jurisdiction. Cable systems voluntarily
entered the business of distributing television signals, and so long
as they still depend on off-the-air television signals, the
mandatory carriage rules can be seen as regulating the physical
means of distributing those signals rather than regulating cable
operators' speech. There is no intrusion into a cable system's editorial judgment that could not be cured by expanding that system's capability. Of course, if a cable system did not carry any
broadcast signals, that might well be a different case, but it is certainly not the case presented in Quincy.
Because the television industry is in transition, and many
consumers are still dependent on broadcast programming, the
suppression by courts of the FCC's attempts to preserve an orderly system of transition is a serious matter. It is disturbing to
think that because speech is involved, the courts will engage in
overly simplistic analysis and will require the FCC to meet an extremely difficult burden in order to justify its regulation of cable.
Such a process seems like "mechanical jurisprudence" and should
be avoided. In light of this background, an examination of the
65. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
66. United States v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
67. 47 U.S.C. § 544(f)(2) (Supp. 11 1984). The House Committee Report
explained the provision by saying:
[A]ll Federal rules, regulations and orders in place on September 21,
1983, including those of the FCC, remain in effect as they were in place
on that date. Such rules, regulations and orders may be amended, but
not in a manner inconsistent with the express provisions of this title.
Regulations which relate to the content of cable service and which remain in effect include the FCC's must-carry requirements ....
HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, CABLE FRANCHISE POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1984).

See also '86 Report, supra note 23, at 896; City of New York v. FCC, 108 S. Ct.

1637, 1644 (1988) (Supreme Court upheld FCC's authority to establish technical standards governing quality of cable television signals stating "[i]n the Cable
Act, Congress sanctioned in relevant respects the regulatory scheme that the
Commission had been following since 1974").
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doctrine used by the court of appeals and the method by which
the court applied that doctrine in their decisions to set aside the
must-carry rules follows.
IV.

CHOOSING AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW

A.

Determining Cable's Key Characteristic

Ever since Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,68 in which the
Supreme Court sanctioned a reduced level of first amendment
protection for the broadcast media, some courts and commentators have treated the level of protection to be applied to cable as a
question of determining whether cable is more like broadcasting
or more like the print media. 69 In Quincy, the court's discussion
regarding the applicable standard 70 suggests that the analysis
should be somewhat more sophisticated than simply making the
above comparison. Indeed, JudgeJ. Skelly Wright was not prone
to simplistic analysis. In past opinions Judge Wright had used a
highly sophisticated and sensitive analysis of the free speech guarantee. 7' In Quincy, too, Judge Wright states -that the court is
"mindful" of the need to consider each new communications medium carefully when applying "the broad principles of the First
Amendment" 72 and makes reference to Justice Jackson's opinion
68. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
69. See, e.g., Central Telecommunications v. TCI Cablevision, 800 F.2d 711,
714 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987); Century Federal, Inc. v.
City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465, 1470 (N.D. Cal. 1986), appeal dismissed, 108
S. Ct. 1002 (1988); L. POWE, supra note 22, at 195.
70. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1447-54.
71. See Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an
Obstacle to PoliticalEquality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982). In this article judge
Wright states:
Like constitutional law generally, first amendment thinking must necessarily adapt to the changing needs and evolving perceptions of society.
But while theoretical formulation and emphasis may change, the core
notion of the first amendment remains the protection of diverse, antagonistic, and unpopular speech from restriction based on substance. To
invoke the first amendment, not to protect diversity, but to prevent society from defending itself against the stifling influence of money in
politics is to betray the historical development and philosophical underpinnings of the first amendment.
Id. at 636 (footnote omitted).
In criticizing the Supreme Court's applications of the first amendment to
the regulation of campaign expenditures, Judge Wright noted: "by ritual incantation of the notion of absolute protection, by applying it to the quantity as well
as the content of political expression, and by making the unexamined and unprecedented assertion that money is speech, the Court elevated dry formalism
over substantive constitutional reasoning." Id. at 633.
72. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1448. On this point Judge Wright observes:
The suggestion is not that traditional First Amendment doctrine falls
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in Kovacs v. Cooper.7 3 Nevertheless, while the opinion demonstrates the court's sophisticated knowledge of the cable industry,
its analysis of the proper standard of review simply distinguishes
cable from the broadcast media on the basis of scarcity, and then
concludes that FCC regulation should be subject to substantial
scrutiny.7 4 A closer look at the opinion is necessary to explain
this conclusion.
The court's discussion of the proper standard of review is divided into two parts: first, the scarcity rationale 75 and second,
whether the must-carry rules should be treated as an incidental
burden on speech. 76 In its discussion of the scarcity rationale, the
court also rejected the idea that cable could be regulated because
it is a natural monopoly or because it involves use of a public
way. 7 7 The court failed to see how "the 'natural monopoly characteristics' of cable could create economic constraints on competition comparable to the physical constraints imposed by the
limited size of the electromagnetic spectrum." 7 8 Furthermore, in
the court's mind, the "fact that cable operators require use of a
public right of way" does not justify regulations which "extend to
the controlling nature of the programming that is conveyed over
the system." 79 But these points are really peripheral and do not
add very much to the court's analysis. The court's approach actuby the wayside when evaluating the protection due novel modes of
communication. For the core values of the First Amendment clearly
transcend the particular details of the various vehicles through which
messages are conveyed. Rather, the objective is to recognize that those
values are best served by paying close attention to the distinctive features that differentiate the increasingly diverse mechanisms through
which a speaker may express his view.
Wright, supra note 71, at 633.
73. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1438 (citing Kovacs, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)). Justice
Jackson concurred in Kovacs because he believed "that operation of mechanical
sound-amplifying devices conflicts with quiet enjoyment of home and park ....
Freedom of speech for Kovacs does not.., include freedom to use sound amplifiers to drown out the natural speech of others." Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 97 (Jackson,
J., concurring).
74. Quincv,, 768 F.2d at 1450.
75. Id. at 1448-50.
76. Id. at 1450-54.
77. Id. at 1449.
78. Id. at 1449-50.
79. Id. at 1449. The court compares the must-carry rules with the regulation of vending machines, concluding that any regulation of what must be placed
in the vending machines would be invalid. Id. That statement was unexceptionable at the time, and certainly correct in light of City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
Pub. Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138 (1988) (statute giving mayor of city unbridled discretion over whether to grant or deny newsrack permits held unconstitutional). For
a further discussion of Cii' qf Lakewood, see Note, City of Lakewood v. Plain
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ally centers on its conclusion that "[i]n light of cable's virtually
unlimited channel capacity, the standard of First Amendment review reserved for occupants of the physically scarce airwaves is
80
plainly inapplicable."An argument can be made that the court addressed the
wrong issue. A conclusion that cable systems are more like newspapers than broadcasting says very little about the relationship
shared by cable systems, television broadcasting and the mustcarry rules. The real question is whether the must-carry rules
constitute an abridgment of speech, not whether cable systems
have limited capacity. Indeed, the court itself recognized that
most systems carry far fewer channels than is technologically possible. 8 ' In Kovacs, the regulation of sound trucks was upheld without any indication that sound trucks represented a means of
communication with limited capacity. The plurality approved the
regulation of one particular means of communication in order to
protect homes and businesses from indiscriminate noise because
the legislature was not restricting the discussion of ideas or issues
by other means of communication. 82 Justice Frankfurter thought
that the authorities were free to limit noise provided content was
not limited. 83 Justice Jackson said simply, that "[fireedom of
speech for Kovacs does not, in my view, include freedom to use
sound amplifiers to drown out the natural speech of others." 8 4 In
other words, in Kovacs the plurality did not exercise any special
level of scrutiny in examining the government regulation.
Rather, it expressly reserved a heightened level of scrutiny for
regulations which threatened to discriminate on the basis of ideas
or form of expression, not means of communications.
Another way of illustrating the point is to view cable systems
as newspapers. Then the question becomes in what way can
newspapers be regulated? In Associated Press v. NLRB 8 5 (Associated
Press I) and Associated Press v. United States " (Associated Press II) the
Supreme Court upheld the regulation of newspapers despite incidental effects on speech. Thus, it can be said that "[ifn most cases
Dealer Publishing Co.; Saia Revisited; Can Kovacs Be Far Behind?, 34 VILL. L. REV.
325 (1989).
80. Quinn', 768 F.2d at 1450.

81. Id. at 1439.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949).
Id. at 96-97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 97 (Jackson, j., concurring).
301 U.S. 103 (1937) (Associated Press I).
326 U.S. I (1945) (Associated Press II).
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the incidental effect on communication of a generally applicable
regulatory scheme is not considered to raise first amendment
problems."8 7 One commentator viewing communications in the
context of technological change, has said:
A distinction should be made between the situation in which
an entity enters the communications business to express
its own constitutionally protected ideas, and that in which
the entity treats its ownership and use of a communications medium merely as a property interest. On a theoretical level, it
seems that the first amendment should afford its full protection in the former case; in the latter situation, however, the
medium should be subject to regulation to the same extent as are
s
businesses in noncommunicationsfields 8
Of course, that statement goes too far, as even its author recog,
nizes. s 9 The point is, however, that the economic regulation must
be separated from speech regulation. Where economic regulation has only incidental effects on speech, as almost any regulation of the communications industry will have, these regulations
should be subject to a standard which grants substantial deference to the governmental authority.
After concluding that "cable's virtually unlimited channel capacity" made the first amendment standard applied to the broadcast media "inapplicable,- 90 the Quincy court said that the
question was whether to review the must-carry regulations under
the O'Brien9 ' test or under the test used for evaluating regulations
that are aimed at suppression of ideas. 92 The court summarized
its choice of standard this way:
Concluding that cable television warrants a standard of
review distinct from that applied to broadcasters, we
87. Schauer, Book Review, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 558, 569 (1984) (footnote
omitted). Schauer suggests that in the newspaper regulation cases the "incidental effects ... receive, apparently, nothing more than mere rationality scrutiny."
Id. at 570 n.46. See also, Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendmient: Observations
on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 91 (1967).
88. Baeza, Book Review, 97 HARV. L. REV. 584, 593 (1983) (emphasis
added).
89. Id. at 593-94. The author goes on to say: "[T]his duality creates a tension in the real world. To the extent that government regulates the conduit
owner in his non-speech capacity, such regulation is likely to affect his and
others' use of the medium for speech purposes. I am not sure that anyone can
fully resolve this problem ...." Id.
90. Quinc', 768 F.2d at 1450.
91. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
92. Qiinov, 768 F.2d at 1450-51.
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next consider whether the must-carry rules merit treatment as an "incidental" burden on speech and therefore
warrant analysis under the balancing test set out in
United States v. O'Brien. Although our review leaves us
with serious doubts about the appropriateness of invoking O'Brien's interest-balancing formulation, we conclude
that the rules so clearly fail under that standard that we
need not resolve whether they warrant a more exacting
93
level of First Amendment scrutiny.
The court neglected to discuss the question of whether the nature
of the must-carry regulations are such that they should be examined as the Supreme Court examined the regulations in Kovacs, 9 4 Associated Press 19 5 and Associated Press 11.96 Those cases
consider whether various regulations constitute an abridgment of
speech, or regulation within the power of the legislature. Except
for Kovacs, these cases involve the application of general business
regulations to the press. The appropriateness of the standards
used in those cases as applied to the must-carry rules requires
discussion.
B.

The Associated Press Standards and O'Brien

Notwithstanding the applicability of the above cases, it is too
simplistic to pose the must-carry question as a choice between
strict scrutiny and a balancing test based solely on cable's superficial resemblance to a non-scarce means of communication. The
more important question concerns the relationship of the mustcarry regulations to the legitimate regulatory authority of the
FCC.

The Quincy court, without considering the question of

whether the regulations amounted to an abridgment of speech at
all, simply concluded that because the regulations affected speech
they must be judged as either incidental burdens (O'Brien) or direct burdens (strict scrutiny). To say that any incidental effect on
93. Id. at 1448 (citations omitted). The more exacting level of first amendment scrutiny to which the Court refers is reserved for that government regulation "which restrains orderly discussion and persuasion, [conducted] at [an]
appropriate time and place." Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 94 (citing Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 548 (1944)). To sustain such regulation the government must
show a compelling governmental interest, supported by a showing of "public
danger, actual or impending ... [which amounts] to gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests." Id.

94. Kovacs, 336 U.S. 77.
95. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
96. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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speech authorizes a court to evaluate the wisdom of the regulations and decide whether they are closely enough tailored to
achieving their purpose is a mechanical approach that puts the
court, perhaps unnecessarily, in a policy-making role. For that
reason a discussion of the must-carry regulations as compared to
the regulations at issue in these other cases follows.
Since the court of appeals utilized the O'Brien test, perhaps
the best place to start is with O'Brien. David O'Brien burned his
draft card on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse in order,
he said, to influence others to adopt his antiwar beliefs. 9 7 He was
convicted of violating a statute that made it a crime to knowingly
destroy or mutilate a draft card. 9 8 O'Brien argued that his action
of burning his draft card constituted "communication of ideas by
conduct" and was protected by the first amendment. 9 9 ChiefJustice Warren, writing for the Court, could not "accept the view
that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea."' 10 0 Nevertheless, the Court went on
to say:
[E]ven on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring
into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily
follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is
constitutionally protected activity. This Court has held
that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms.' 0 '
Not only was O'Brien engaged in conduct aimed at protesting government policies, the statutory provision that formed
the basis for his conviction was enacted by Congress in the face of
continuing antiwar demonstrations.1 2 The first amendment issues in O'Brien are, therefore, very different from what is involved
97. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369-70 (1968).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 376.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 371. Indeed, the Supreme Court said that the court of appeals in
O'Brien's case had "concluded that the [provision] ran afoul of the First Amendment by singling out persons engaged in protests for special treatment." Id.
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in the must-carry regulations. While the FCC might be seen as
protecting the local broadcasters through the must-carry regulations, in O'Brien the government could be seen as suppressing the
expression of antiwar sentiment.
Thus, if one views O'Brien as one line of analysis and Kovacs
and the two Associated Press cases as another, an issue is presented
as to which line should apply to the must-carry rules. The mustcarry rules do not constitute general business regulations applicable to all businesses, and that is the one factor in favor of applying
O'Brien. At the same time, however, nothing in the must-carry
rules serves to suppress controversial speech. Indeed, cable companies under must-carry rules remain free to express whatever
ideas they like. Furthermore, the must-carry regulations serve to
ensure continued free competition in a market that is somewhat
more complex than the usual market for goods. While the balance seems to weigh in favor of applying the Associated Press line of
cases, at a minimum the court of appeals should have made this
comparison before deciding to apply O'Brien.
In Associated Press 1103 the Supreme Court upheld the application of the labor laws to the Associated Press to require the reinstatement of an editorial employee who had been fired for his
union activities. The Court defined the issue as whether the statute as applied abridged the Associated Press' freedom of
speech.' 0 4 The Associated Press argued that its product, impartial news reports, necessitated its freedom to choose its editorial
employees. 0 5 The majority of the Court disagreed and held that
application of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to the
press did not violate the first amendment. It is easy, as the dissenters in Associated Press I did, to characterize the application of
the labor laws in this context as a restriction on the freedom of
speech. 10 6 It is certainly reasonable to assume that active members of a union might have pro-union sympathies, and therefore
that forbidding a newspaper to fire editors due to union membership intrudes to some extent on the first amendment rights of the
newspaper. As Justice Sutherland explained in his dissent:
Strong sympathy for or strong prejudice against a given
cause or the efforts made to advance it has too often led
to suppression or coloration of unwelcome facts. It
103.
104.
105.
106.

Associated Press v. NIRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 137-38 (Sutherland, j., dissenting).
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would seem to be an exercise of only'reasonable prudence for an association engaged in part in supplying the
public with fair and accurate factual information with respect to the contests between labor and capital, to see
that those whose activities include that service are free
from either extreme sympathy or extreme prejudice one
07
way or the other.
While the application of the labor laws did, to some degree,
restrict editorial discretion, the Court simply found that the first
amendment rights of the Associated Press were not abridged.
The Court did not discuss the nature of the need for labor laws,
or whether the labor laws were sufficiently tailored so that they
achieved their purpose without abridging the editorial discretion
of the newspapers to which they applied.1 0 8 Where the Associated Press reported on labor-management relations, the incidental effect of requiring employment of unionized editors intruded
far more into the content of the material printed than did the
must-carry regulations. The effect in Associated Press I was clearly
not content-neutral.
In Associated Press H,109 the Associated Press' restrictive news
and membership practices were challenged as violating the antitrust laws. These practices prevented non-members from obtaining news from the Associated Press or their members. In
addition, it was difficult for newspapers in competition with Associated Press members to become members themselves. The Associated Press argued that the "clear and present danger" test
afforded newspapers some immunity from the antitrust laws because they were in the business of distributing news and information.1 10 The Supreme Court responded: "Formulated as it was
to protect liberty of thought and of expression, it would degrade
the clear and present danger doctrine to fashion from it a shield
107. Id. at 138 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 131-33. The Court did state that the labor laws being challenged
"do[] not compel the petitioner to employ anyone; [they] do[] not require that
the petitioner retain in its employ an incompetent editor or one who fails faithfully to edit the news to reflect the facts without bias or prejudice. The act permits a discharge for any reason other than union activity or agitation for
collective bargaining with employees." Id. at 132.
The Court went on to observe that "[tihe business of the Associated Press is
not immune from regulation because it is an agency of the press. The publisher
of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws."
Id.
109. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
110. Id. at 7.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989

21

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 2

488

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34: p. 467

for business publishers who engage in business practices condemned by the Sherman Act.""'I
The claimed free speech right amounted to a right to decide
to whom to sell or not sell news once gathered. Furthermore,
while the refusal of the Associated Press and its members to give
news to non-members did not prevent the non-members from
gathering and distributing news themselves, the Supreme Court
nevertheless thought the competitive disadvantage to which it
subjected the non-members justified government action."12 In
response to the argument that government action forbidding
these restrictive practices amounted to an abridgment of the freedom of the press, the Supreme Court replied:
It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for freedom of the press which prompted adoption
of the First Amendment should be read as a command
that the government was without power to protect that
freedom. The First Amendment, far from providing an
argument against application of the Sherman Act, here
provides powerful reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public,
that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a
command that the government itself shall not impede
the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental
combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon
that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to
publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but
freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is
not. Freedom of the press from governmental interfer11. Id.
112. Id. at 17-18. Speaking of the competitive environment created by the
Associated Press, the Court stated that: "It is apparent that the exclusive right to
publish news in a given field, furnished by AP and all of its members, gives many
newspapers a competitive advantage over their rivals." Id. at 17 (emphasis added). The Court here took a pragmatic view of a monopoly by stating that
"[miost monopolies, like most patents, give control over only some means of
production for which there is a substitute; the possessor enjoys an advantage
over his competitors, but he can seldom shut them out altogether; his monopoly is
measured by the handicap he can impose .... " Id. at 17 n. 17 (emphasis added). The
must-carry rules respond to this view of a monopoly and its detrimental effects,
but the Quincy court failed to recognize the practical impact of the signal selection power cable systems now enjoy.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss3/2

22

Mallamud: Judicial Intrusion into Cable Television Regulation: The Misuse o

1989]

CABLE TELEVISION REGULATION

489

ence under the First Amendment does not. sanction repression of that freedom by private interests. The First
Amendment affords not the slightest support for the
contention that a combination to restrain trade in news
and views has any constitutional immunity.' '
Although there are considerable differences between the
must-carry rules and the laws at issue in the Associated Press cases,
there are also similarities. The most apparent difference is that
while the must-carry rules apply only to a particular industry,
both the antitrust and labor laws are general and apply to many
industries. Both Associated Press I and Quincy involved regulations
which intrude on content. Although Associated Press I did not involve the total ouster of control over content as did the mustcarry rules, by approving the application of labor laws to the
press, the Supreme Court upheld a much greater content-related
intrusion than the must-carry rules present. Moreover, Associated
Press H touches on the restraint issue which is at the heart of the
cable controversy. In the antitrust case the restraint involved the
possession of the news, that is, the content of the newspaper.
With the must-carry rules the restraint involves preventing broadcast stations from reaching their viewers by the now dominant
14
method of signal reception.
After reviewing these two competing lines of cases, the question arises as to which offers the better doctrinal framework to be
applied to the must-carry rules. In O'Brien the governmental regulation had a clear impact against a particular point of view and a
specific means of communicating that view. However, the Court
upheld the regulation, rejecting the position which equated action with speech, and characterizing any impact on O'Brien's freedom of expression as incidental. In the case of the must-carry
rules the government is regulating the economic aspects of cable
companies. Because the business is that of communications,
speech is incidentally affected but not in a manner which discriminates or silences unpopular viewpoints. The must-carry regulations are completely content-neutral. This contrasts sharply with
the draft card situation in which burning the draft card was meant
to constitute a protest to the war and a refusal to serve as a military participant. Rather, the must-carry rules represent an attempt to regulate only the competitive relationships among those
113. Id. at 20 (footnote omitted).
114. For further discussion of this point, see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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in the business of delivering television signals to the public. Because must-carry rules deal with the regulation of the business
aspects of the communications media, the Associated Press cases
represent a far better source of guidance to evaluate the constitutionality of the must-carry rules than does O'Brien.
C. Application of Associated Press Cases to Must-Carry Rules
Despite the above conclusion that application of the Associated
Press cases is more appropriate to the must-carry situation, the
outcome under such an approach requires further discussion.
These cases stand for the proposition that despite some incidental effects on speech, government is free to apply legitimate economic regulations to the mass communications industry. Thus, a
news service may not violate the antitrust laws when deciding how
to distribute the information it has in its exclusive editorial control. Similarly, legitimate labor laws apply to the news services
even though there may be incidental effects on the content of the
material in the newspaper. In both cases the fact that the governmental regulations in question applied to all businesses was significant in upholding the regulations despite some infringement
15
upon the freedom of the press."
As the court of appeals in Quincy recognized, cable television
started as a passive conduit of broadcast signals and has now added to that function the ability of delivering signals originated
primarily for cable.' "6 If the Quincy court were skeptical of the
legitimacy of the FCC regulation of cable television, then one
could understand why the court might choose O'Brien rather than
the Associated Press cases as the means of analysis. However, the
court should have come to grips with this problem rather than
framing the question as whether cable should be regulated in the
same manner as the broadcast media.' 17 The only hint of the
possible illegitimacy of the regulation surfaces when the court
115. No attempt is being made to distinguish between freedom of speech
and freedom of the press. Presumably, editorial discretion could be exercised
by a writer of a letter free from government control, although it is true that the
concept of editorial discretion is most easily supported by reference to the
Court's decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (statute requiring newspapers to allow free space for rebuttal by criticized political candidates unconstitutional).
116. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1452.
117. The Quincy court summarized its findings as follows: "Nor do we discern other attributes of cable television that would justify a standard of review
analogous to the more forgiving First Amendment analysis traditionally applied
to the broadcast media." Id. at 1449.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss3/2

24

Mallamud: Judicial Intrusion into Cable Television Regulation: The Misuse o

1989]

CABLE TELEVISION REGULATION

concludes that cable does not have a natural monopoly status to
justify the regulation and suggests that the tendency toward monopoly "may well be attributable more to governmental actionparticularly the municipal franchising process-than to any 'natural' economic phenomenon." ' "1 8 To justify applying O'Brien, the
court should have shown that rather than regulating the business
aspects of cable television operations, the FCC was trying to stifle
the speech of the cable operators. After all, O'Brien claimed that
burning his draft card constituted "symbolic speech" and that by
making that act criminal, the government not only abridged his
first amendment rights, but did this to further its own interests.' '9
Since Associated Press II held that the government could interfere
with the way the communications industry distributed its services,' 20 it might have been hard for the court of appeals to contend that the FCC could not mandate that a cable company
distribute local stations to local viewers. Must-carry certainly
does not amount to the suppression of antigovernment speech as
was involved in O'Brien. Nevertheless, it could be argued that
what started as necessary regulation has now been made obsolete
by the maturation of over-the-air broadcast markets, and the natural evolution of the cable industry into equal competitors with
the broadcasters. However, this argument's foundation is rooted
in an economic/political foundation, to be addressed by Congress, not the courts.
This argument demonstrates why the court of appeals should
not have decided Quincy as it did. The impact of must-carry rules
on free speech is no more intrusive than in the Associated Press
cases, and these rules serve to permit local stations to continue to
compete on a reasonable basis for the attention of viewers. In
that sense, as in the antitrust setting of Associated Press H, the mustcarry rules further first amendment interests. In any event, by
striking down the FCC's rules, the court of appeals involved itself
in defining the business of cable television, and decided that cable
had progressed to a point that warranted repeal of the must-carry
rules. In effect, the Quincy case involved a business judgment and
regardless of whether the judgment of the court was good or bad,
it was a judgment that should have been left to the FCC and
Congress.
The rationale of the court of appeals for doing away with the
118. Id. at 1450 (citation omitted).
119. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
120. Associated Press 1I, 326 U.S. at 19-2 1.
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must-carry rules-the existence of so-called A/B switches that
would allow listeners to switch between cable and over-the-air receptionl 2 '-seems somewhat simplistic. Given the fact that the
television industry is still in a state of transition, and the regulations at issue are designed to deal with the problem of delivery of
signals to viewers, a strong case exists for the application of the
methodology of the Associated Press cases. Application of this standard would lead to a recognition that the must-carry rules are really in line with the objectives of the first amendment, as well as to
the sustaining of the rules by giving deference to the decision of
the FCC.
D.

The Court's Misapplication of O'Brien

In O'Brien the Supreme Court established the test to be ap22
plied when speech and non-speech elements are combined.
Under that test:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. 123
Clearly, in O'Brien the raising of armies was a substantial government interest. 12 4 Although O'Brien argued that the draft card did
not serve an important function in the system beyond notification
of registrants that they had registered or received a particular
classification, the Court was able to list a number of functions
2 5
served by the continued possession of the cards by registrants.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1441.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
Id. at 377.
Id. at 377-78.
Id. at 378-80. The purposes listed by the Court were:
1. The registration certificate serves as proof that the individual
described thereon has registered for the draft. The classification certificate shows the eligibility classification of a named but undescribed individual. Voluntarily displaying the two certificates is an easy and
painless way for a young man to dispel a question as to whether he
might be delinquent in his Selective Service obligations. Correspondingly, the availability of the certificates for such display relieves the Selective Service System of the administrative burden it would otherwise
have in verifying the registration and classification of all suspected de-
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Having established that continued availability of the cards served
an important governmental interest, the Court said: "We perceive no alternative means that would more precisely and narrowly assure the continuing availability of issued Selective Service
certificates than a law which prohibits their willful mutilation or
destruction."' 1 26 The Court avoided deciding whether the prohibition against destroying the draft card was narrowly tailored to
achieving the government purpose by articulating the possession
of the draft cards as a purpose unto itself, rather than discussing
the interests of the government in raising armies and maintaining
a draft system. Thus, even in O'Brien the Court was able to frame
the opinion in a way that gave considerable deference to the governmental decision.

In Quincy the court of appeals began its consideration of the
must-carry rules under the O'Brien standard by considering
whether the limits on speech were incidental. In the court's view,
the object of the must-carry rules was "to assure that the rise of a
potentially monolithic national television industry not undermine
' 27
the economic vitality of free, locally-controlled broadcasting."'
This broad statement, which might seem reasonable as a governlinquents ....
Additionally, in a time of national crisis, reasonable
availability to each registrant of the two small cards assures a rapid and
uncomplicated means for determining his fitness for immediate induction ....
2. The information supplied on the certificates facilitates communication between registrants and local boards, simplifying the system
and benefiting all concerned.
3. Both certificates carry continual reminders that the registrant
must notify his local board of any change of address, and other specified changes in his status. The smooth functioning of the system requires that local boards be continually aware of the status and
whereabouts of registrants, and the destruction of certificates deprives
the system of a potentially useful notice device.
4. The regulatory scheme involving Selective Service certificates
includes clearly valid prohibitions against the alteration, forgery, or
similar deceptive misuse of certificates. The destruction or mutilation
of certificates obviously increases the difficulty of detecting and tracing
abuses such as these. Further, a mutilated certificate might itself be
used for deceptive purposes.
The many functions performed by Selective Service certificates establish beyond doubt that Congress has a legitimate and substantial interest in preventing their wanton and unrestrained destruction and
assuring their continuing availability by punishing people who knowingly and wilfully destroy or mutilate them. And we are unpersuaded
that the pre-existence of the nonpossession regulations in any way negates this interest.
Id.
126. Id. at 381.
127. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1451.
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mental goal, seriously skews the analysis. Later in the opinion the
court found the rules defective because of insufficient proof of
harm to local broadcasting. 2 8 In discussing whether the rules
were overbroad, the court suggested that their purpose was to
protect "localism" and not "local broadcasters," 12 9 and found
them overinclusive because they "indiscriminately protect each
and every broadcaster regardless of the quantity of local service
available in the community and irrespective of the number of local outlets already carried by the cable operator."' 130 The court's
position fails to recognize that absent the must-carry rules a cable
system's refusal to carry a particular station places that station at a
competitive disadvantage. This power to distort the competitive
balance in the local marketplace amounts to a license for extortion as well as a threat to the integrity of the local licensing system. Thus, a primary goal of the must-carry rules was to protect
the FCC's allocations of stations to markets.' 3' Arguably, the
must-carry rules were so effective when in force, that the FCC was
without evidence of the ill-effects of an unregulated market at the
time Quincy was decided. In Quincy, the FCC seems to have fallen
victim to its own efficiency and foresight.
Another problem in Quincy was the court's refusal to recognize that cable systems occupy a dual status. On the one hand
cable operators distribute the programming of local broadcasters
and on the other they obtain additional television programming
for the viewers either by importing distant broadcast signals or
obtaining television signals originated for distribution by cable.
The must-carry rules affect the first function of cable systems; in
retransmitting the local signals the cable systems are not engaged
in programming decisions. If the court had viewed the situation
128. Id. at 1458-59. The court stated: "We hold only that in the particular
circumstances of this constitutional challenge the Commission has failed adequately to demonstrate that an unregulated cable industry poses a serious threat
to local broadcasting and, more particularly, that the must-carry rules in fact
serve to alleviate that threat." Id. at 1459.
129. Id. at 1460. The court observed that "if the goal is to preserve 'localism' and not 'local broadcasters,' the must-carry rules are 'grossly' overinclusive." Id. (citation omitted).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1441-42. The court seemed to recognize the basis for the rules
when it said: "Only if local broadcasters were assured access to the whole of
their allocated audience, the FCC believed, could the risk of audience fragmentation and the concomitant threat to free, local television be forestalled." Id. at
1441. The FCC's allocation to local markets is based on a statutory directive. 47
U.S.C. § 307(b) (1982). See also '86 Report, supra note 23, at 912 (separate statement of Commissioner James B. Quello).
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this way, the cable business would be one in which the cable operator (1) delivered local broadcast signals to its subscribers' homes
and (2) gave to the subscriber such additional programming as
the cable operator chose to provide. The limitations on the
amount of additional programming available would then be properly viewed as a function of the system's channel capacity-a factor dependent on the cable operator's initial decision as to the
desired capacity of the system.
Instead, in considering whether the rules have only an incidental effect on speech within the meaning of O'Brien, the court
found two intrusions into free speech interests. The first was that
cable programmers might be shut out of the market served by a
given cable system to the extent that the must-carry signals filled
the available cable channel space.' 3 2 The second was the intrusion into the editorial freedom of the cable operators. 133 Because
of these intrusions, the court was reluctant to treat the rules as
having only an incidental effect on freedom of speech. 3 4 However, since the court found the regulations to be impermissible
under O'Brien, it never reached the question of "whether a more
35
exacting standard" was appropriate.
While recognizing mandatory carriage of local stations as an
intrusion on first amendment rights, the court did not recognize
the need for cable systems to carry the stations for homes using
cable. Since the local broadcast signals can be received off the air,
the court was skeptical that the must-carry rules were necessary. 136 The court viewed the A/B switch as the way to ensure
cable subscribers' access to local broadcasting. 3 7 The premise
was that viewers would maintain both cable and an aerial, allowing them to switch back and forth between the two. One
might think that such a factual assumption would be something to
leave to the FCC. But the court's interpretation of the O'Brien test
enabled it to make such an assumption on its own initiative.
The major problem with the court's application of O'Brien is
132. QuincV, 768 F.2d at 1451-52.
133. Id. at 1452.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1454. The court said that "the Supreme Court's prior treatment
of other laws and regulations that impinged on the editorial function engenders
at least some doubt about the appropriateness of shunting the must-carry rules
onto the analytical track reserved for other incidental burdens on expression."
Id. at 1453.
136. Id. at 1441.
137. Id.
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that it places "a heavy burden ofjustification" on the FCC.' 3 8 As
the court put it: "In the context of this case the question becomes
whether the Commission has adequately proven that without the
protection afforded by the must-carry rules the economic health
13 9
of local broadcast television is threatened by cable."'
It is doubtful that O'Brien requires the level of proof mandated by the court of appeals in Quincy. In O'Brien, the Supreme
Court itself seemed to find the governmental purpose that justified the requirement at issue-the Court certainly did not require
proof that the draft cards served a governmental purpose.14 0 The
Supreme Court in O'Brien merely stated:
We think it apparent that the continuing availability
to each registrant of his Selective Service certificates substantially furthers the smooth and proper functioning of
the system that Congress has established to raise armies.
We think it also apparent that the Nation has a vital interest in having a system for raising armies that functions
with the maximum efficiency and is capable of easily and
quickly responding to continually changing circumstances. For these reasons, the Government has a substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of
14 1
issued Selective Service certificates.
Professor Tribe discussed this rationale by stating: "While Selective Service regulations required registrants to have their cards in
their possession at all times, the requirement had not been seriously enforced. . . . The Selective Service had been quite casual
about the possession requirement and had expressed no concern
for the efficiency of the draft laws."' 142 Thus, O'Brien would be
better understood in the context of a regime in which courts gave
a very high degree of deference to the government's assertions
that the regulation was justified by a legitimate governmental purpose.' 143 In that context O'Brien can be seen as calling for the
138. Id. at 1462.
139. Id. at 1455.
140. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 378-81.

141. Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
142. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-6, at 825 (2d ed.
1988).
143. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (Court
upheld Illinois absentee ballot system which excluded unsentenced inmates
awaiting trial finding that. the law had a "rational relationship to a legitimate

state end" through the presumption of constitutionality afforded legislative action, and lack of any evidence to the contrary); Williamson v. Lee Optical of
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courts, where the case applies, to find that there is in fact a substantial governmental purpose for the regulation rather than simply presuming that such a purpose exists.
In Quincy the court of appeals framed the main issue as
"whether the Commission has adequately proven that without the
protection afforded by the must-carry rules the economic health
of local broadcast television is threatened by cable."' 14 4 In order
to show the problems with the court's application of O'Brien to
this case, it is necessary to go into some detail.
The court began its analysis by referring to the fact that the
FCC had recently deregulated broadcast and cable television,
although the must-carry rules remained in effect.145 On the question of the FCC's continued adherence to a policy of localism the
court rightly said:
It simply does not follow that deregulation, even massive
deregulation, implies a wholesale abandonment of the
goal of preserving local broadcast television. Although
the Commission of late has pursued different means to
that end-preferring to rely on the free market rather
than active administrative oversight-it has never wavered from its view that preservation of local television is
146
a cornerstone of its regulatory policy.
The court went on to consider that when the FCC rescinded some
substantial limitations on cable systems, the FCC found that the
broadcasting industry was in good financial health and that cable
did not appear to be a negative force. 14 7 The FCC responded
that the rescission of a number of cable regulations was premised
on the continuance of the must-carry rules.148 The court seemed
to reject this argument, however, and responded that at least in
the case of VHF broadcasting, the FCC's analysis "appears to
deny their major premise-that unfettered growth of cable television threatens the economic vitality of local broadcasting."' 41,
Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (Court relied upon presumption of constitutionality of legislative action to uphold Oklahoma law which prohibited optician from fitting or duplicating lenses without prescription).
144. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1455.
145. Id. at 1455-56.
146. Id. at 1455 n.45.
147. Id. at 1456. See also Inquiry into the Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcastingand Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 861 (1979).
148. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1456.
149. Id.
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But the court did not rest any conclusions on this statement. Instead the court said:
But even if we accept the Commission's position
that it continues to stand by the economic assumptions
on which the must-carry rules are premised, we would
still be unable to conclude that it has adequately carried
its heavy burden of justification. For if the FCC has not
repudiated the rules' underlying assumptions, neither
0
has it proved them.15
At this point it is useful to focus on the nature of the points
that the FCC was required to prove. As the court put it:
[The FCC] has never sought support for the assumptions that are the linchpins of its analysis: (1) that without protective regulations cable subscribers would cease
to view locally available off-the-air television either because they would disconnect their antennas or because
the inconvenience of a switching device would deter
them; and (2) that even if some cable subscribers did
abandon local television, they would do so in sufficient
numbers to affect the economic vitality of local
broadcasting. 151

The court ignored the fact that because of the FCC rules, the
cable systems did carry the signals. The court also ignored the
fact that it is difficult to prove that people would not watch local
broadcast television stations if those stations were not carried by
cable unless the FCC actually did away with the rules to see what
would happen. 152 Furthermore, the FCC's experience with UHF
tuning 53 would seem to indicate that people might not watch
broadcast television if they had to change to a different kind of
150. Id. at 1457.

151. Id.
152. Since the must-carry rules have ceased to exist, information has been
collected about the number of stations that have been dropped by cable systems.
See, e.g., Tis the Season of Must-Cany Surveys, BROADCASTING, Aug. 15, 1988, at 97;
Real-World Data on a Post-Must-Cany World, BROADCASTING, Sept. 5, 1988 at 3031; NCTA Study Shows Cable Canying Most Stations, BROADCASTING, Sept. 19, 1988
at 59-60; Local TV Stations Still Carriedby Cable, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) No. 24 at
1 (Sept. 20, 1988) (reporting that six percent of cable systems surveyed had
"dropped or opted not to carry at least one station since the rule lapsed."). No
surveys were found which examined how many cable subscribers viewed the
dropped stations after they were no longer carried on their cable system.
153. For further discussion of the FCC's experience with VHF tuning, see
supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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tuner. In any event, this is an issue that should have been left to
the Commission to decide. The court, on the other hand, takes
the position that a simple A/B switch will enable subscribers to
switch between antenna (assuming they have one) and cable and
that whether subscribers will actually do so "is almost certainly
susceptible of empirical proof." 154 Thus, the issue seems to turn
on some assumptions about human behavior and the extent to
which loss of cable viewers would actually result in economic
harm to non-cable broadcasters. For this reason, it is useful to
look at another case in which this kind of predictive judgment was
at issue.
In FCC v. National Citizens Committeefor Broadcasting,15 5 (NCCB)
the Supreme Court reviewed the FCC's regulations proscribing
newspaper/broadcasting cross-ownership, that is, ownership by
one entity of a newspaper and a broadcasting station in the same
market. In adopting a proscription on such combinations for the
future, the FCC allowed existing combinations to continue. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit set aside the
56
Commission's failure to break up the existing combinations.
In justifying its ruling the court of appeals stated:
[T]he Commission could not have rationally concluded
that the competing policies it offered justified
grandfathering absent a show of harm. And, since the
record does not disclose the extent to which divestiture
would actually threaten these values, the Commission
could not have rationally concluded, if it did, that their
potential impairment overcame the presumption against
57
cross-ownership.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on this point
on grounds that the factual determinations involved "were primarily of a judgmental or predictive nature . . . [and therefore]
complete factual support in the record . . .is not possible or required.',' 5 81 While the points on which proof might have been required in that case differ from the points at issue in Quincy, they
are similar with respect to the kind of speculation in which the
154. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1457 n.48.
155. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
156. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C.
Cir.), modified, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
157. Id. at 965 (footnote omitted).
158. NCCB, 436 U.S. at 813-14.
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FCC had to engage. 159 By stating the issue in terms of proof required, the Quincy court acted as if it were simply seeking support
in the record for the FCC's decision, while in fact the court made
the type of value judgment expressly reserved for the FCC by the
Supreme Court in NCCB. Under the Associated Press line of cases, a
court would first have to decide whether there was an infringement of free speech rights before being called on to make the
value judgments. Because with compulsory carriage rules it
would appear that the FCC is simply regulating the business aspects of cable delivery of television signals, the value judgments
made by the court of appeals in Quincy should have been left to
the FCC.
In response to this type of argument, the Quincy court stated
that NCCB did not apply because the issues involved in compulsory carriage rules were capable of factual support. 6 0 While that
is correct, it is arguably correct in the NCCB situation also. In
both cases the issues could only be proved after adopting a policy
contrary to that actually adopted by the Commission. The Commission should not have to adopt what it determines is the wrong
policy in order to establish that the policy is in fact wrong.
Although the must-carry rules are discrete enough so that the error could probably be corrected after a number of broadcasting
stations suffer severe damage, that type of cost should not be required before allowing economic regulation.
The "proof" requirement is exacerbated by the addition of
the overbreadth finding by the court. 16 1 In addition to failing to
find sufficient proof of harm to establish a proper purpose, the
court stated:
Moreover, because the must-carry rules indiscriminately
sweep into their protective ambit each and every broad159. The Supreme Court gave the following examples of prospective policy
decisions properly within the scope of the FCC's rule-making authority:
whether a divestiture requirement would result in trading of stations
with out-of-town owners; whether new owners would perform as well as
existing crossowners, either in the short run or in the long run; whefher
losses to existing owners would result from forced sales; whether such
losses would discourage future investment in quality programming; and
whether new owners would have sufficient working capital to finance
local programming.
Id. In summary, the Court stated that "a forecast of the direction in which future
public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency." Id. at 814 (citation omitted).
160. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1458.
161. For further discussion of the proof requirement, see supra notes 12731 and accompanying text. See also Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1459-62.
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caster, whether or not that protection in fact serves the
asserted interest of assuring an adequate amount of local
broadcasting in the community, the rules are insufficiently tailored to justify their substantial interference
62
with First Amendment rights.
Thus, to justify the rules not only does it appear that the FCC
would have to show that people would not be as likely to watch
stations not carried on cable, but also that the failure to view
those stations would lead to an inadequate amount of local
broadcasting.
Although the court appeared to subject the FCC to an unattainable standard of proof, it took pains to point out that "we
have not found it necessary to decide whether any version of the
mandatory carriage rules would contravene the First Amendment." 6 3 The court confined its declaration of invalidity to the
64
must-carry rules "in their current form."'
Given this limiting statement it is not surprising that the FCC
modified the must-carry rules.' 6 5 This time the FCC limited the
rules to five years and tied them to a requirement that A/B
16 6
switches be furnished and the public educated to their use.
Applying the level of proof articulated in Quincy, the court of appeals set aside the revised rules in Century Communications Corp. v.
FCC by stating:
Although the FCC has eliminated the more extreme demands of its initial set of regulations, its arguments in
this case leave us unconvinced that the new must-carry rules
are necessary to advance any substantial governmental
interest, so as to justify an incidental infringement of
speech under the test set forth in United States v.
162. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1463.
163. Id. The court noted: "We hold only that in the particular circumstances of this constitutional challenge the Commission has failed adequately to
demonstrate that an unregulated cable industry poses a serious threat to local.
broadcasting and, more particularly, that the must-carry rules in fact serve to
alleviate that threat .... " Id. at 1459.
164. Id. at 1463.
165. '87 Memorandum, supra note 23, at 3593. The court of appeals in Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 2014 (1988), invalidated the FCC interim must-carry rules which had gone
into effect on June 10, 1987. These interim must-carry rules are reprinted at '87
Memorandum, supra note 23, at 3620.
166. See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 296 (D.C.
Cir. 1987), claified, 837 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2014 (1988).
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O'Brien. 167
Again, the court seemed to hold the door open to still another
version of the must-carry rules saying: "It may well be that upon
a suitable record showing, the justification offered by the FCC,
that interim regulations are needed to keep local broadcasts accessible to viewers while the new switch-and-antenna technology
168
takes hold, would satisfy the O'Brien standard."'
Once again the O'Brien standard skews the argument and lets
the court act as if its decision is rooted in a failure of the record
rather than a difference in valuejudgments. The court faulted the
FCC for not offering evidence that consumers would fail to obtain
A/B switches on their own once stations are dropped from
cable. 169 By the time the court heard Century Communications, however, the National Association of Broadcasters had come up with
a survey that showed that many cable subscribers had taken down
their aerials when they got cable, that only about 10% of the cable
subscribers presently switch between cable and their antenna, and
that only about 1% of cable subscribers actually had both an outdoor antenna and an A/B switch.' 70 Nonetheless, the court
found that even that information was insufficient to support the
7
FCC's five-year requirement of must-carry.' '
167. Id. at 293 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 300.

169. Id.
170. See id. at 301. The FCC's discussion of the survey data can be found at
'86 Report, supra note 23, at 880-85.
171. The court dealt with the FCC's data as follows:
This NAB study is essentially a statistical compilation of survey results
gleaned from a poll of 610 heads of cable households. The FCC cites
this survey generally without pinpointing any specific parts of it that
would strongly support the new must-carry regime ....
Among its melange of disparate facts and findings, the study includes four items of information that arguably could be said to point to
a need for interim must-carry rules: (1) only about 1% of cable subscribers presently have both the outdoor antenna and A/B switch
needed to gain access to noncarried local programming in the absence
of must-carry rules; (2) many cable viewers originally owning antennas
have taken them down, because they were unsightly, and only about
10% of cable subscribers presently switch back and forth between cable
and antennas; (3) a third of cable homes have video cassette recorders
and thus may face some increased difficulty attaching the A/B switch;
and finally, (4) about half of cable subscribers doubted that if local
broadcast stations were dropped from cable they would buy what the
survey termed a "special switch" enabling them to go back and forth
between cable and their antennas. Primarily on the basis of these findings, and particularly the finding that relatively few homes are presently
equipped with both antennas and switches, the report concludes that
the transition to a world without must-carry could force consumers as a
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In fact, the court seemed to act as if the regulatory process is
very different from what it is. In a proceeding such as the one
formulating the new must-carry rules, the rule-making process involves the submission of views and comments by affected industry
groups. 172 As the FCC pointed out, "[t]hese interim must-carry
rules are a modified version of the proposed industry agreement
that was filed jointly by several of the major broadcast and cable
trade associations."'' 73 Because these regulatory issues are decided in a highly political process in which the major participants
are those who are being regulated, the need for judicial protection seems to be much less than the usual first amendment situation. The industries are interdependent and have common as
well as competing interests. In such a situation it is hard to understand why the court would want to set aside an industry compromise which had FCC approval and did not silence the
expression of any party. Cable companies remain free to choose
the programming on most of their channels, and are able to enwhole to expend millions of dollars. It does not, however, suggest that
the new technology would be especially costly to consumers on an individual basis. Nor does it estimate how long it would take for most
households to acquire and install the required switch and antenna.
Even accepting the NAB's findings as accurate, it requires an inferential leap of some distance to arrive at a need for five more years of
must-carry. Only through the rosiest of broadcasters' lenses can the
NAB study's first salient finding-that there is a dearth of antenna-andswitch setups in American households-be seen as pointing to the difficulty of installing such gear or to the inability of consumers to learn of
their availability. More likely, the absence of such equipment from
most homes reflects the obvious reality that, so long as the government
requires cable companies to offer local broadcasting through the mustcarry regime, such supplemental equipment is unnecessary. The FCC's
own determination that the consumer misperception upon which it so
heavily relies "is a direct result of the former must carry rules," . ..
seriously undercuts the NAB's implication that the unavailability of
switch-and-antenna gear is an endemic or long-term problem.
The NAB study's second finding, that few of those with switch-andantenna capability currently switch back and forth between cable and
broadcast with any regularity, can most reasonably be accounted for by
the fact that, in a must-carry world, the need to do so is slight. Like the
fact that few households have installed switches and antennas, this finding merely describes present reality without offering any glimpse into
how the change of one key variable-the lapse of must-carry regulations-would affect that reality.
Century, 835 F.2d at 301.
172. See, e.g., '87 Memorandum, supra note 23, at 3594-99.
173. '86Report, supra note 23, at 864 (footnote omitted). The groups were
listed in the footnote, as follows: National Association of Broadcasters, The Association of Independent Television Stations, Television Operators Caucus, National Cable Television Association and Community Antenna Television
Association. Id. at 898 n.84.
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hance this freedom as economic conditions allow for expanded
channel capacity. For the court to promote another battle after a
truce is somewhat beyond the court's proper reviewing
function.174
It is also hard to refrain from suggesting that the court lacks
candor when it states:
Our decision ...is a narrow one. We hold simply
that, in the absence of record evidence in support of its
policy, the FCC's reimposition of must-carry rules on a
five-year basis neither clearly furthers a substantial governmental interest nor is of brief enough duration to be
considered narrowly tailored so as to satisfy the O'Brien
test for incidental restrictions on speech. We do not
suggest that must-carry rules are per se unconstitutional,
and we certainly do not mean to intimate that the FCC
may not regulate the cable industry so as to advance substantial governmental interests. But when trenching on
first amendment interests, even incidentally, the government must be able to adduce either empirical support or
5
at least sound reasoning on behalf of its measures.17
174. Abolition of the must-carry rules affects competitive relationships and
complicates other issues. For example some have questioned cable's right to
use broadcast signals, that is, the compulsory license. See Must Carry, Must Pay in
the Works, BROADCASTING, June 19, 1989, at 29; FCC wants Congress to Dump Compulsory Licenses, BROADCASTING, Oct. 31, 1988, at 29-30; Wrong Premise in "Closed
Circuit", BROADCASTING, July 4, 1988, at 6. In other words, broadcasting supplies programming to cable, and, as one cable executive explained, there is a
public trust in keeping the broadcasters in business, because if they were not
kept in business the government might see cable as a monopoly and regulate it
as such. Broadcasters, Cable OperatorsCome Together, BROADCASTING, June 6, 1988,
at 31. There is also the issue of whether networks should be allowed to own
cable systems with the attendant possibility that a network-owned cable system
might decide not to carry a local station. See Choosing Sides on Network-Cable Crossownership, BROADCASTING, Oct. 31, 1988, at 57-58; F.C.C. to Reconsider Cable Proposal, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1988, at DI, col. 3-4. Another issue concerns
syndicated exclusivity rules. See Broadcast, Cable Groups Propose Opposite Syndex
Changes, BROADCASTING, Aug. 29, 1988, at 56-57. Still another is whether telephone companies should be allowed into the cable television business. See, e.g.,
FCC's Patrick Urges Telco Entry into Cable, BROADCASTING, June 12, 1989, at 57;
infra note 175 and accompanying text.
175. Century, 835 F.2d at 304. In addition, the effect of Quincv may be to
push broadcasters into an alliance with telephone companies, a development
with uncertain consequences for the public interest. See Glimmers of CarriageCompromise Between Telcos, Broadcasters, BROADCASTING, Feb. 6, 1989, at 27; Quello Having Second Thoughts About Telco Entry, BROADCASTING, Jan. 16, 1989, at 98. The
question of allowing telephone companies into the television business is under

active consideration. See The Evolution of Cable'sAnti-Telco Strategy, BROADCASTING,
Mar. 6, 1989, at 30; NAB to Congress: Put Telco Entry on Hold, BROADCASTING, Feb.
13, 1989, at 121.
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In contrast to the seemingly insurmountable level of proof
required in Quincy and Century Communications, the method used in
the Associated Press cases would require the court to decide
whether the FCC was regulating speech or regulating the business of distributing information. The must-carry rules, as explained, would seem more properly to fall under the regulation of
business. The problem for the court is that if the must-carry rules
are classified as business regulation, it would not be able to insist
upon "record evidence."'' 76 Thus, by applying O'Brien in the way
it did, the court was able to make value judgments that should be
left to the FCC, and, at the same time, was able to write the opinion as if the disagreement with the FCC is only with the sufficiency of the record. Indeed, the court of appeals did here what,
17 7
arguably, the Supreme Court said it could not do in NCCB.
In justifying the revised must-carry rules, the FCC pointed to
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.178 and suggested that the
Renton analysis would be more appropriate in this context, and if
applied would result in judicial affirmation of the rules.1 79 Renton
involved a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance that
prohibited adult motion picture theaters within 1,000 feet of residential zones, dwellings, churches, parks and schools. The
176. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1977).
In Vermont Yankee the Court considered the extent to which a court could reverse
an administrative agency's ruling (here the Atomic Energy Commission's licensing of a nuclear power plant) when the agency had complied with the Administrative Procedure Act, but had failed to establish what the Court considered an
adequate record to support the agency's position. The Court in reversing the
court of appeals stated:
This sort of Monday morning quarterbacking not only encourages but
almost compels the agency to conduct all rulemaking proceedings with
the full panoply of procedural devices normally associated only with
adjudicatory hearings....
[I]mportantly, this sort of review fundamentally misconceives the nature of the standard for judicial review of an agency rule.
In short, nothing in the APA, NEPA, the circumstances of this case,
the nature of the issues being considered, past agency practice, or the
statutory mandate under which the Commission operates permitted the
court to review and overturn the rulemaking proceeding on the basis of
the procedural devices employed (or not employed) by the Commission
so long as the Commission employed at least the statutory minima, a
matter about which there is no doubt in this case.
Id. at 547-48.
177. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775
(1978). For further discussion of the NCCB case, see supra notes 155-60 and
accompanying text.
178. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
179. '86Report, supra note 23, at 187-89 & 893-94.
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Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's invalidation of the
ordinance. The court of appeals had used O'Brien to find that the
City of Renton had improperly used the experience of other cities
in formulating its ordinance rather than using "evidence" about
the effects of adult theaters on Renton. 8 0 The Supreme Court
criticized the court of appeals' approach. 18 ' According to the
Supreme Court, the court of appeals had imposed "an unnecessarily rigid burden of proof." 18 2 The case differs from the mustcarry cases because the city was relying on the experience of other
cities,183 rather than using its experience with an industry as its
main guide. In holding that the city used a permissible method to
further its objective, the Supreme Court pointed out that it was
8 4
not the court's job to assess the "wisdom" of the ordinance.
Even though the court found that the restriction of first amendment rights was "a motivating factor" in passing the ordinance,
the Supreme Court held that since the district court found that
the "predominate" motivation was pursuit of legitimate zoning
interests, the ordinance was unrelated to "the suppression of
freedom of expression."

185

Certainly the method used in Renton is more in line with the
Associated Press cases. Moreover, it enables the courts to review
governmental action to see whether it impedes freedom of speech
while preventing those courts from applying their own values to
determine whether the governmental action should be upheld.
The foregoing analysis of the decisions on the must-carry
rules should illustrate what is wrong with the court of appeals'
application of O'Brien in the Quincy case. Difficulties arise whenever there is need to regulate the business aspects of a communications business. If courts continue to use the Quincy
180. The Court specifically overruled the heavy burden of proof imposed
on the City by the court of appeals:
We hold that Renton was entitled to rely on the experiences of Seattle

and other cities, and in particular on the "detailed findings," summarized in the Washington Supreme Court's Northend Cinema opinion, in
enacting its adult theater zoning ordinance. The First Amendment does not
require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce

evidence independent of that already generated by other cities, so long as whatever
evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that
the city addresses.
Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 50.
182. Id.
183. Id.at 51.
184. Id. at 52.
185. Id. at 48.
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methodology, it will put the courts in the position of passing on
the wisdom of regulations. It also changes the focus of the analysis and makes the courts consider a factual basis at a level of specificity beyond the proper scope of the courts. Instead, courts
should focus on whether the regulation interferes with speech to
the point of constituting an interference with the freedom of
speech. In Renton and the Associated Press cases one can find some
interference with speech, but the regulation goes mainly to zoning in Renton and business in the Associated Press cases.
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF QUINCY

In City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 86 the
Supreme Court held that a city's award of an exclusive franchise
to a cable company had first amendment implications. However,
the Court left open the question of the methodology to be used in
resolving the first amendment attack on the cable franchising process. 8 7 Nevertheless, in the wake of Quincy, there is substantial
sentiment for applying O'Brien to cases involving challenges to exclusive franchises on first amendment grounds. 188 While differ186. 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986).
187. Id. at 494-95. The Court did say that "[wihere a law is subjected to a
colorable First Amendment challenge, the rule of rationality which will sustain
legislation against other constitutional challenges typically does not have the
same controlling force." Id. at 496. Three Justices conditioned their joining of
the Court's opinion on their "understanding that it leaves open the question of
the proper standard for judging First Amendment challenges to a municipality's
restriction of access to cable facilities." Id. at 496 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
188. See Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. 1322,
1332 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (cable operator obtained injunction against city's refusal
to grant cable franchise); Group W Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz, 669 F.
Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (Group W Cable obtained permanent injunction
which allowed cable operator to retain its operations subject to fee for use of
city's easements).
One commentator has said that "[t]he O'Brien test was applied to cable television in Preferred Communications." Hollinrake, Cable Television: Public Access and
the FirstAmendment, 9 COMM. & L. 3, 27 (1987). For a discussion of the problems
of renewal of cable franchises including the implications of the first amendment,
see Van Eaton, Old FranchisesNever Die? Denving Renewal under the FirstAmendment
and the Cable Act, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37 (1987). However, it is important to note in this context that a federal statute, the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. 11 1984), authorizes the granting of
cable franchises and forbids operation of a cable system without such a
franchise. An exception is made for a cable system lawfully operating on July 1,
1984. Id. § 541(b)(2).
A recent article deals with the constitutionality of exclusive franchising and
access under the Act. See Brenner, Cable Television and the Freedom of Expression,
1988 DUKE L.J. 329. In noting that the courts use O'Brien in the cable context,
he calls "the test's predictive value dubious." Id. at 363. He says, "[a] court
reviewing content-neutral regulations, particularly of a multiple-activity medium
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ences exist between a prohibition on operation without a
franchise and the must-carry regulations, the application of
O'Brien puts the courts into a similar kind of policy-making role.
If used as the court of appeals did in Quincy, it could easily lead to
a wrong decision because it requires "proof" of a governmental
justification rather than a belief and understanding on the part of
the court that a governmental purpose is being advanced and that
the regulations are not abridging the freedom of speech.
At the same time, the question of whether cable franchising is
permissible in light of the first amendment is a much harder one
than the validity of must-carry rules. The O'Brien test in this context tends to obscure for the decision-maker the need to weigh
carefully the necessity for business regulation against its particular inroads on free speech. Cable systems represent a hybrid between a broadcaster and a common carrier. A court needs to be
aware of cable's bifurcated function. If the cable business were
limited to stringing wires between homes and a distribution
center, cable franchising would probably not raise first amendment issues. The fact that this function is combined with the ability to choose what signals to provide, however, is the key that
adds the first amendment dimension to the problem. It is important to keep the functions separate. The distribution function really does not raise the free speech issue. That issue is raised by
the choice of what to distribute. If a community is permitted to
license the distribution function, then the question becomes
whether that licensing function should be limited by the first
amendment because it is more convenient to give the cable operator the ability to choose programming also. It is not the purpose
of this article to reach a conclusion about the constitutionality of
cable franchises. Rather, it seems that there is a danger that if the
O'Brien test is used as the basis for analyzing the problem, the
wrong result may very well be reached.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Cable television, which originated as a means of distributing
television signals to viewers, has now reached the point where it
provides a substantial amount of additional programming. When
with competing first amendment interests, must be guided by a search for the
actual regulation's suppressive effects on opportunities for expression." Id.
Although Brenner, in his disucssion of access channels appears to accept Quilic
as the applicable law, id. at 373-77, he also appears to recognize that the Quinc'
court may have misapplied O'Brin. Id.at 363 n.148.
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cable television started, a system of local television broadcasting
was already in place. That system was comprised of local stations
that were required to serve the needs and interests of the local
communities. Because cable could totally undercut the local television system, the FCC acted to protect the broadcasting system
that was already in place by instituting compulsory carriage
rules."' Although the Commission at one time could be seen to
be unduly stifling the growth of cable in order to protect the
broadcasters, 190 by the time Quincy was decided the major limitation on cable systems was the must-carry rules. Even the court in
Quincy recognized the values involved in the preservation of the
system of local broadcasting by stating:
[U]nfettered growth of new video services may well
threaten other deeply ingrained societal values. In particular, the complete displacement of expressive outlets
attuned to the needs and concerns of the communities
they serve not only would contravene a long-standing
historical tradition of a locally oriented press but might
itself disserve the objective of diversity.19 '
In retaining the must-carry rules the FCC preserved the local
television broadcasting market by facilitating the ability of all stations licensed in a market to reach the television audience in that
market. Given their experience with UHF stations, the FCC continued the must-carry rules out of concern that once people had
cable, they would confine their viewing to the stations carried on
cable. If a station was not carried on a cable system, that station
(especially now that over 50% of television homes use cable)
would have a difficult time surviving. One must also be concerned about a new station. If that station had no access to cable,
or if cable charged an exorbitant carrying fee, that would create
an unjust competitive advantage in favor of established broadcast
stations and cable channels.
While it is true that at some time cable may eclipse broadcast
television as the primary means of distributing television signals,
that time has not yet come. It seems to make very good sense to
preserve the ability of broadcast stations to operate in the market
without being dependent on cable systems. It is hard to under189. The FCC's authority to do so was upheld in United States v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 151, 167-68 (1968).
190. See Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1439 n.l0.
191. Id. at 1462.
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stand why a programming competitor of the local broadcasters,
who also controls a primary means of distribution, should be allowed to dictate which of its competitors will be allowed access to
this distribution. While it is true that the FCC is without jurisdiction to impose public access requirements on a cable system because cable is not considered a common carrier, 9 2 the must-carry
rules are ancillary to the FCC's jurisdiction to regulate broadcasting and thus within its jurisdiction.1 9 3 In other words, the access
is not afforded to the public generally, but to those people who
possess an interest in serving a particular market that is supported by a federal license.
The analysis of the Associated Press cases would uphold the
must-carry rules. One can easily view an obligation to carry local
television stations as one part of the cable television business,
which markets improved reception of local stations as a feature of
its product. The other part of the business is transmitting
whatever additional channels the cable operator selects. The
question of how many additional channels to offer is a matter
within the control of the cable operator who decides how large a
system to build. After all, when cable operators entered the field
they did so with the must-carry rules in effect. Cable operators
still market their product in two parts: local signals and additional services. Keeping the local signal requirement intact does
not limit the cable operator's choice of what other signals to distribute. Certainly, the FCC, by requiring local signals to be carried, was not suppressing controversial speech.
One must also keep in mind the realities of the regulatory
process in this area. First, cable systems have grown and developed in large part through the use of broadcast signals. Second,
the two industries, cable and broadcasting, are also in competition. Third, broadcasting is dependent on cable for distribution
to cable homes. The regulation of these two industries through
the FCC and Congress is carried out through negotiations between the industry representatives of both groups. Thus, Congress and the FCC are involved in balancing the interests of those
industries while bringing to bear considerations of the public interest.' 9 4 Regulations are going to be compromises that cannot
192. See FCC v. Midwest-Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
193. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 157.
194. In this connection it is important to keep in mind what Judge Wald
(now ChiefJudge) said in Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981):
Under our system of government, the very legitimacy of general
policymaking performed by unelected administrators depends in no
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be justified by the kind of rational decision-making engaged in by
courts. Furthermore, justifications for each compromise are
based on prospective analyses by each party, and therefore,
nearly impossible to document with proof of historical data.
By applying O'Brien in the manner it did, the Quincy court
manipulated the FCC's burden of proof in such a way that the
court was able to use its value judgments rather than those of the
FCC and Congress in deciding whether the must-carry rules
should be upheld. For example, the court denounced the rules
because they required protection for every broadcaster, not just
those actually harmed. 19 5 The Court in Quincy paid lip service to
the proper role of the FCC saying that "it is for the Commission
and not this court to ascertain which broadcasters or classes of
broadcasters are sufficiently at risk to warrant protection." 16c But
then the court went on to say: "We observe only that the Commission's failure to draw any lines at all makes it impossible to
conclude that it has satisfied its affirmative obligation to prove
that the rules are 'sufficiently tailored to the harms it seeks to prevent to justify its substantial interference' with First Amendment
rights."' 19 7 The court failed to recognize that the purpose of this
protection was to preserve the local market system and to see that
the local stations' ability to compete was not diminished by allowing the cable systems to decide which stations would and
which stations would not get access to the homes served by the
cable system. The failure of the court to view the problem in this
way was evidenced by the court's reliance on the A/B switch and
small part upon the openness, accessibility, and amenability of these
officials; to the needs and ideas of the public from whom their ultimate

authority derives, and upon whom their commands must fall. As judges
we are insulated from these pressures because of the nature of the judicial process in which we participate; but we must refrain from the easy
temptation to look askance at all face-to-face lobbying efforts, regardless of the forum in which they occur, merely because we see them as
inappropriate in the judicial context, Furthermore, the importance to
effective regulation of continuing contact with a regulated industry,
other affected groups, and the public cannot be underestimated.
Id. at 400-01 (footnotes omitted).

195. Quincy, 768 F.2dat 1462. The Quincy court rioted:
Yet, oblivious to the must-carry rules' primary object of protecting local
broadcasters from competitive injury (and thus preserving localism),
each and every broadcaster from the struggling UHF educational station to the most profitable VHF network affiliate-no matter how prof-

itable, no matter how invulnerable to significant cable-induced revenue
losses-can demand mandatory carriage.
Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citation omitted).
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its assumption that people would continue to maintain aerials after subscribing to cable. By using O'Brien, the court relied on that
factor without proof simply by saying that the FCC failed to show
that people would not maintain their aerials. Similarly, after a
compromise was reached and the FCC promulgated temporary
must-carry rules, the court in Century Communications invalidated
these rules because it was "unpersuaded" by the proof offered by
the FCC that the five-year interim period was the amount of time
needed to educate consumers about the A/B switch.' 9 8
If O'Brien remains the standard in these cases, then it becomes easy for a court to set aside agency action by skillfully
framing the questions posed. But it is hard to see that the questions posed by the court of appeals relate at all to the question of
whether the FCC abridged cable operators' freedom of speech.
The must-carry rules really do not suppress, or even inhibit,
speech. The FCC, in promulgating the must-carry rules, was acting to protect the position of the broadcast stations within its jurisdiction, and the governmental purpose of promoting the local
broadcast system is certainly well established and substantial. It is
also not hard to view the continuation of that system, pending the
supplanting of it totally by cable television, as a substantial governmental objective. The means of doing so, by ensuring that
cable systems are not in a position to decide which of the local
broadcasting stations will reach its audience, also seems to be a
rational response that relates to the business aspects of cable
television.
On the surface, the first amendment argument articulated by
the court of appeals seems plausible. It is appealing to suggest
that since broadcasters continue to enjoy the over-the-air market
any protection of them is unjustified. This argument, however,
loses its force when the dual aspects of the cable industry are
made explicit. Additionally, the fact that cable grew and developed by selling off-the-air programming to its own customers in
addition to selling newer programming developed for the cable
systems, makes it more apparent that the surface argument is
based on a somewhat simplistic view of the industries involved.
198. Century, 835 F.2d at 304. The court specifically stated:
[I]n the absence of any empirical support for the new must-carry rules,
the FCC falls back on what it terms a "sound predictive judge," that it
will take about five years for consumers to learn about the switch-andantenna mechanism, and thus that a five-year transition period is
needed during which the agency will provide consumer education.
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It is also important to keep in mind that the FCC is dealing
with an industry in transition. The must-carry rules are a means
of regulating competitive relationships in an industry threatened
by technological change. If cable had totally supplanted the
broadcasters there would certainly be no reason to continue to
protect them. But that is not the case. The situation now is one
of rapid change and development. The must-carry rules are a
means of easing the transition.
By using O'Brien to evaluate the rules, the court of appeals
doomed the rules to failure. In this context O'Brien is not a standard for insuring free speech. Rather it provides courts with a
means of evaluating economic regulation and setting aside those
regulations they do not like. Given the nature of regulation in
this context it is very difficult for the FCC to come up with the
"proof" necessary to justify the rules. In that way the application
of O'Brien is a decision to strike down the rules, rather than a
means of weighing the interests involved.
As suggested, the Supreme Court has, in the past, dealt with
regulations in the communications area in a way that permits the
preservation of free speech without forcing the courts into evaluating the wisdom of particular regulations. Methods like those
used in Kovacs and the Associated Press cases allow the courts to
decide whether the government is suppressing speech or carrying
out a legitimate governmental purpose such as protecting people
against noise or regulating business. Because of developments in
technology, such as cable television systems, it has become harder
to sort out what is the regulation of speech and what is the regulation of business. The application of O'Brien to situations like
those involved in the must-carry controversy does very little to aid
the analysis and does a great deal to allow the courts to intrude
into the sphere of policy-making-the area properly reserved for
the administrative agencies and the legislature. Quincy and Century
Communications were mistakes, and it is hoped that the methodology used will be abandoned in cases involving economic regulation of the business of communications.
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